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Aging Disgracefully: Do Economic Laws Remain 
Rational in Spite of Changed Circumstances? 
Johanna Talcott*
INTRODUCTION
Rational basis review—especially as it applies to economic 
regulation—needs a little more bite. Many scholars, practitioners, and 
judges have critiqued the Supreme Court’s unfavorable treatment of 
economic liberties and the highly deferential nature of its lowest standard of 
review.1 Some have advocated for changes in the Court’s approach to both, 
such as bulking up the scrutiny of rational basis review or eliminating 
distinctions between constitutional rights.2 While such calls are well-
founded and forceful, it is unlikely that there would be any substantial 
overhaul of nearly a century of firmly established constitutional 
jurisprudence.3 An alternative method is that the courts can implement 
          *   J.D. candidate, May 2016, Florida International University College of Law; M.A., The 
Pennsylvania State University; B.A., University of Florida. I owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to 
Dominique Pando Bucci, Jeremy Talcott, and Bryan Wilson for their help with this endeavor. 
1 See, e.g., Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 480–83 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Brown, J., 
concurring); Patel v. Texas Dep’t of Licensing and Reg., 469 S.W.3d 69, 98–99 (Tex. 2016) (Willett, J., 
concurring); Randy E. Barnett, Scrutiny Land, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1479 (2008); Aaron Belzer, Putting
the “Review” Back in Rational Basis Review, 41 W. ST. U. L. REV. 339 (2014); Marc P. Florman, The
Harmless Pursuit of Happiness: Why “Rational Basis with Bite” Review Makes Sense for Challenges to 
Occupational Licenses, 58 LOY. L. REV. 721 (2012); Elizabeth Price Foley, Judicial Engagement, 
Written Constitutions, and the Value of Preservation: The Case of Individual Rights, 19 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 909 (2012); Jessica E. Hacker, The Return to Lochnerism? The Revival of Economic Liberties from 
David to Goliath, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 675 (2002); Clark Neily, No Such Thing: Litigating Under the 
Rational Basis Test, 1 NYU J.L. & LIBERTY 898 (2005); Note, Resurrecting Economic Rights: The 
Doctrine of Economic Due Process Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1363 (1990); Austin Raynor, 
Economic Liberty and the Second-Order Rational Basis Test, 99 Va. L. Rev. 1065 (2013); Timothy 
Sandefur, Equality of Opportunity in the Regulatory Age: Why Yesterday’s Rationality Review Isn’t 
Enough, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 457 (2004); Timothy Sandefur, The Right to Earn a Living, 6 CHAP. L.
REV. 207 (2003); Neelum J. Wadhwani, Rational Reviews, Irrational Results, 84 TEX. L. REV. 801 
(2006).
2  Some scholars have advocated for shifting the burden of proof back onto the government in 
rational basis review cases. See, e.g., Belzer, supra note 1, at 373 (proposing a “rationale review 
standard” for all nonsuspect class equal protection challenges, in which a successful prima facie case of 
an inappropriate classification would shift the burden on the government to justify the rationale behind 
the classification); Foley, supra note 1, at 927 (advocating for a return to the “old-school rational basis 
review” utilized by the pre-New Deal Supreme Court, which required the government to “prove a close 
fit between the means chosen and the purpose of the law”). Cf. Barnett, supra note 1, at 1499–1500 
(advocating for elimination of the fundamental/non-fundamental rights dichotomy under due process in 
favor of a “presumption of liberty” that is generally rebuttable by the government). 
3 See Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1, 
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minor doctrinal approaches, which comport with existing Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, but incrementally shift the law towards strengthened judicial 
scrutiny and greater preservation of economic liberty—sort of a “rational 
basis review with nibble.”4 One such modest approach is the changed 
circumstances doctrine.5
When courts adjudicate legislation that impacts economic liberty, the 
applicable level of scrutiny, rational basis review, requires only that the 
government articulate a legitimate government interest (and if not, the court 
can even conceive of one) and assert that the law is a rationally related 
means of achieving that interest.6 Challenged legislation is afforded an 
extremely strong presumption of constitutionality and the courts have no 
obligation to conduct any fact-finding whatsoever into the rationality of the 
government’s actions.7 In order to prevail, a challenger must essentially 
prove that every conceivable reason that the legislature may have had in 
passing the legislation is irrational.8 In practice, this is a nearly 
insurmountable task.9 For example, the Supreme Court sided with the 
plaintiffs in only ten out of one hundred rational basis review cases between 
1973 and 1996.10 By the Court’s logic, all of those challenged laws were 
constitutionally rational. 
But does a law remain rational indefinitely? Given the rapid clip of 
social and technological change––and the notorious lag of government––
1–4 (2001); see also Foley, supra note 1, at 927. 
4 The author cannot locate any other instances of this phrase being used, but it seems an 
appropriate descriptor for an approach that does not substantively disrupt established law or doctrine and 
applies only in a relatively narrow range of cases. 
5 See discussion infra pages 506–523. 
6 See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313–15 (1993); Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 
312, 319–20 (1993). In equal protection cases, the Court applies rational basis review in challenges to 
legislation that distinguishes between economic or social classes (nonsuspect classes). Strict scrutiny is 
reserved for legislation that distinguishes between suspect classes (race, national origin, and alienage) or 
burdens a fundamental right, and intermediate scrutiny for legislation that distinguishes between quasi-
suspect classes (gender, illegitimacy). In substantive due process cases, the Supreme Court bifurcates 
individual liberties into fundamental and non-fundamental rights. Fundamental rights are those which 
are “objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.” Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997). 
7 Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 315 (“[A] legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact-
finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.”). 
8 Heller, 509 U.S. at 320 (“A statute is presumed constitutional and the burden is on the one 
attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it.”) 
(citations and quotations omitted). 
9 See Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model 
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (describing rational basis review as 
“minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact”). 
10 Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from the 1971 Term 
Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 416 (1999). 
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laws and regulations risk becoming outdated as the factual circumstances 
that justified their enactment begin to disappear.11 Governments prudently 
leave many outdated laws unenforced, such as the Pennsylvania statute that 
requires motorists to stop every mile on rural roads to send up rocket 
signals, the Michigan law that prohibits a married woman from going to the 
hair stylist without her husband’s permission, or the ban on Sunday yo-
yoing that is on the books in a handful of states.12
With economic regulation, however, governments may continue to 
enforce laws even after drastic changes in factual circumstances render 
them obsolete. This might be the case, for example, when some new 
product, business model, or innovation emerges that the legislature could 
not have anticipated and did not account for in the existing regulatory 
framework.13 Established businesses, which have often invested 
considerable costs to operate under existing regulations, are understandably 
frustrated when their competitors are not bound by the same restrictive and 
expensive rules.14 Governments often respond by continuing to enforce the 
outdated regulations, or requiring indirect competitors to comply with 
existing regulations, even when doing so verges on the absurd.15
11 A cursory Google News search suggests that this is a fairly common feature throughout the 
world. See, e.g., Kathleen Gray, Michigan Laws in Crosshairs: Don’t Cuss, Dye Chicks, USA TODAY
(Mar. 24, 2015), www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/03/24/mich-laws-crosshairs-cuss-dye-chic
ks/70404872; Tiffany Owens, Ala. Legislators Seek to Repeal Antiquated Laws, CULLMAN TIMES (Mar. 
17, 2015), www.cullmantimes.com/news/ala-legislators-seek-to-repeal-antiquated-laws/article_a0619e4
2-cc47-11e4-91d5-af3fc27c9839.html; Jane Walsh, Ireland to Revoke 5,782 Outdated Laws, IRISH
CENT. (Mar. 17, 2015), www.irishcentral.com/news/Ireland-to-revoke-5782-outdated-laws.html.
12  Stephanie Morrow, Top Craziest Laws Still on the Books, LEGAL ZOOM (Oct. 2009), 
www.legalzoom.com/articles/top-craziest-laws-still-on-the-books.
13 See Erica Taschler, A Crumbling Monopoly: The Rise of Uber and the Taxis Industry’s 
Struggle to Survive, LOY. SCH L.: NEWS AND VIEWS (June 2015), www.luc.edu/media/lucedu/law/cen
ters/antitrust/pdfs/publications/newsviews/Erica%20Taschler%20New%20%20Views%20With%20Edit
s%20%20Footnotes.pdf.
14 See id. The government shares in the frustration when businesses find ways to lawfully 
circumvent the rules. See, e.g., Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471 (D.C. Cir. 2012); see also Dan
Morgan, Sarah Cohen & Gilbert M. Gaul, Dairy Industry Crushed Innovator Who Bested Price–Control 
System, WASH. POST (Dec. 10, 2006), www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/12/09/AR
2006120900925.html.
15   For example, one rule in an arcane web of Pennsylvania funeral industry regulations prohibits 
the serving of food or intoxicating beverages at a funeral home. The Third Circuit upheld the regulation, 
which dated back to the fifties. Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56, 86 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. 
Ct. 220 (2014); see also Patel v. Texas Dep’t of Licensing and Reg., 469 S.W.3d 69, 73–74 (Tex. 2016) 
(evaluating a requirement for eyebrow threaders to obtain expensive and time-consuming cosmetologist 
licenses). Cf. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015) (involving a prohibition 
against non-dentists from performing simple teeth whitening procedures). Unfortunately, governments 
seldom respond to these conflicts by lifting the burdensome regulations for everyone. One recent 
example is the dispute in Austin, Texas, over Uber and Lyft refusing to abide by background check 
requirements imposed on taxi drivers. The popular ride-sharing services ultimately departed the city. See
Jared Meyer, What Elizabeth Warren Gets Wrong About Uber, REASON (May 23, 2016), 
www.reason.com/archives/2016/05/23/what-elizabeth-warren-gets-wrong-about-u; see also J.D. Tuccille, 
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The Supreme Court contemplated that factual circumstances could 
change enough to render continued enforcement of a law irrational. In the 
seminal case United States v. Carolene Products, the Court was clear that 
“the constitutionality of a statute predicated upon the existence of a 
particular state of facts may be challenged by showing to the court that 
those facts have ceased to exist.”16 This changed circumstances doctrine 
requires courts to evaluate the rationality of a law with regard to the 
objective factual circumstances existing when the law is challenged, rather 
than when it was enacted. The Court never overruled Carolene’s mandate17
and consistently gives weight to changed factual circumstances in other 
areas of constitutional law.18 Nevertheless, lower courts have diverged over 
whether and how to account for changed factual circumstances in rational 
basis review.19 Those courts that have deviated from Carolene’s rule have 
focused on practical concerns and a perceived ambivalence from the 
Supreme Court on the issue.20
This comment argues that courts that have abandoned the changed 
circumstances doctrine in rational basis review have gotten it wrong. A law 
must pass constitutional muster not only when enacted but also when 
enforced––holding otherwise could effectively put an expiration date on 
constitutional rights. The changed circumstances doctrine is an essential 
component of rational basis review that, if employed consistently, serves as 
a much-needed judicial limit on economic regulation. This comment first 
reviews the history of the Supreme Court’s development of rational basis 
review and declining protections for economic liberty. It then examines 
After Winning Regulatory Battle Against Ride-Sharing Firms, Austin Turns to Black Market and 
Deregulation, REASON (May 31, 2016), www.reason.com/archives/2016/05/31/after-winning-regulatory-
battle-against.
16 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938). 
17  The Supreme Court has never had the opportunity to directly address the issue of whether a 
law’s constitutionality must be evaluated with regard to the facts in existence at the time the law is 
challenged—all of the one hundred and fifty rational basis review cases to reach the Supreme Court in 
the seventy-eight years since Carolene were challenges to recently enacted legislation. Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari at 14, Heffner v. Murphy, 135 S. Ct. 220 (2014) (No. 14-53), 2014 WL 3530761, at *14 
[hereinafter Heffner v. Murphy Petition].
18 E.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 
(2013).
19  Courts’ analyses of changed circumstances have cut across several areas of constitutional law 
and all levels of judicial scrutiny. See, e.g., Allison Orr Larsen, Do Laws Have a Constitutional Shelf 
Life?, 94 Tex. L. Rev. 59 (2015); Maria Ponomarenko, Changed Circumstances and Judicial Review, 89 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1419 (2014); Sean G. Williamson, Contemporary Contextual Analysis: Accounting for 
Changed Factual Conditions Under the Equal Protection Clause, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 591 (2014). 
20 E.g., Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Reg., 763 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(finding that circumstances had not sufficiently changed to make regulation unconstitutional); Dias v. 
City & Cnty. of Denver, 567 F.3d 1169 (10th Cir. 2009) (permitting a due process claim to proceed on a 
theory of changed circumstances). 
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how the Supreme Court and other courts have approached changed factual 
circumstances and their impact on a law’s constitutionality. The final 
section advances arguments for why accounting for changed circumstances 
is, and should remain, a basic part of the rational basis review, as well as 
how the changed circumstances doctrine could benefit economic liberty. 
THE RISE OF RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW AND FALL OF ECONOMIC LIBERTY
Depending on one’s political or philosophical proclivities, rational 
basis review and the Court’s hostility towards economic liberty represent 
either a complete derailing of fundamental constitutional principles21 or the 
proper preservation of legislative power and democracy.22 Through 
whichever lens this history is perceived, there can be little dispute that in 
modern practice, judicial review for economic regulation has become so 
highly deferential that it operates as little more than a “rubber stamp of 
approval” for government action.23
The earliest roots of rational basis review lie in the English common 
law, which prohibited arbitrary and unreasonable government actions and 
required any intrusions into a citizen’s liberty to be justified.24 This concept 
was imported into American constitutional law to preserve life, liberty, and 
property, primarily with regard to procedural due process.25 By the end of 
the nineteenth century, the Court began to evaluate legislation for its impact 
on substantive due process, and struggled with ascertaining which 
legislative actions fell within and beyond the police power of the states.26
The tool the Court developed to make this determination was a means-end 
arbitrariness analysis, of which one of the earliest and clearest articulations 
is found in Mugler v. Kansas:
If . . . a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public 
health, the public morals, or the public safety, has no real or substantial 
relation to those objects, or is a palpable invasion of rights secured by 
the fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and 
21 See sources cited supra note 1. 
22 See, e.g., Howard Gilman, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER
ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 1–18 (1993). 
23 See, e.g., Richard B. Sapphire, Equal Protection, Rational Basis Review, and the Impact of 
Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 88 KY. L.J. 591, 607 (2000) (citing several cases and articles referring to 
the “softness” and “leniency” of rational basis review). 
24  Jeffrey D. Jackson, Putting Rationality Back into the Rational Basis Test: Saving Substantive 
Due Process and Redeeming the Promise of the Ninth Amendment, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 491, 499–501 
(2011) (citing Blackstone’s Commentaries). 
25 Id.
26 Id. at 502–11 (describing a number of early Due Process Clause cases). 
37901-fiu_11-2 Sheet No. 109 Side B      06/27/2016   12:34:37
37901-fiu_11-2 Sheet No. 109 Side B      06/27/2016   12:34:37
C M
Y K
11 - TALCOTT_FINAL_6.26.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/26/16 8:32 PM
500 FIU Law Review [Vol. 11:495 
thereby give effect to the Constitution.27
In earlier cases, the legislation under review was granted—either 
explicitly or implicitly—a presumption of constitutionality, and the 
challenger bore the burden of proving it unconstitutional.28 Challengers 
were largely unsuccessful: Under this general scheme, the Supreme Court 
upheld as constitutional ninety-two of the ninety-eight substantive social 
and economic acts of legislation that came before it.29
The infamous Supreme Court case Lochner v. New York implemented 
only a minor change in the existing means-end review calculus, but its 
impact and significance have reverberated broadly.30 The Court’s 
development of the highly deferential rational basis review that exists today 
reflects an explicit rejection of the type of searching scrutiny utilized in 
Lochner and its progeny, as well as Lochner’s protection of economic 
liberty. The Lochner era is often characterized as a time when an 
overzealous, activist Supreme Court sought to stymie progressive 
government action by striking down laws and regulations with which it 
disagreed under the guise of an unenumerated right to contract.31 A far more 
accurate characterization is that the Court variously validated and 
invalidated economic regulations during this time period by conducting 
careful factual inquiries in an effort to satisfy the established means-end 
arbitrariness test.32 Understood properly, Lochner serves as an example of 
27  Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661–62 (1887). 
28  Jackson, supra note 24, at 510. 
29 Id. at 508. 
30 See DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER 1–8 (2011) (describing the widespread, 
but misplaced, derision of Lochner by judges, scholars, journalists, and even President Obama). 
31 See id., at 1–8; see also Neily, supra note 1, at 903. This strong disapproval of Lochner has 
enjoyed uniquely broad overlap between liberals and conservatives, albeit for largely different reasons. 
See Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, The Return of Lochner, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 527, 529 (2015). 
At the core of most Lochner criticisms is the perception of an overreaching, unrestrained judiciary. Id.
For liberals, this hinges on the perceptions of the Court’s unseemly protection of a right—the right to 
contract—that should not warrant constitutional protection and of the Court’s inappropriate supplanting 
of the legislature’s wisdom and judgment with its own theoretical preferences. Id. Conservatives, 
although far more sympathetic to economic rights, are generally opposed to the protection of rights that 
are not specifically enumerated in the text of the Constitution. Id. This conservative preference for 
judicial restraint is largely in response to the Warren and Burger Courts’ willingness to identify and 
protect unenumerated rights. Id. at 528. The conservative angle in the anti-Lochner orthodoxy is 
evolving, however, as it has become clear that substantial judicial deference has led to the virtual 
elimination of fundamental constitutional rights––most severely economic liberty. Id. at 531. 
32  See BERNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 1–8. In fact, the Supreme Court decided ninety-seven cases 
regarding substantive due process between 1913 and 1920, and in a meager five of those cases was the 
legislation overturned. Jackson, supra note 24, at 513. Four cases from the Lochner era dealing with 
minimum wage and hour laws—Lochner v. City of New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), Muller v. Oregon,
208 U.S. 412 (1908), Adkins v. Children’s Hosp. of Dist. of Colum., 261 U.S. 525 (1923), and W. Coast 
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937)—particularly illustrate the Court’s lack of consistency (i.e., 
the Lochner Court did not strike down every progressive economic regulation that came before it, as is 
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the type of thorough factual analysis that courts undertake when 
considering challenges based on changed circumstances.
The Lochner facts are straightforward—the New York Bakeshop Act 
placed a number of regulations on bakeries, including strict limits on the 
number of hours that employees could voluntarily work.33 As it had 
previously done, the Court recognized that the statute interfered with the 
right to contract between the employer and employees, but that the state 
could place reasonable limits upon that right.34 Significantly, the Lochner
Court changed its approach to due process analysis and implicitly shifted 
the burden onto the government to prove that the interference was a 
reasonable exercise of the police power.35
The state proffered a number of public health and safety reasons for 
limiting the number of hours that bakers may work, such as preventing 
fatigue, limiting flour inhalation, and ensuring the cleanliness of bakers and 
their products.36 The Court looked at each alleged justification with a 
skeptical eye and found that the limitations on worker’s hours made little 
sense in light of the numerous other rules that regulated the bakeshop 
facilities themselves.37 Lochner should not be characterized as a wholesale 
dismissal of legislation on the sole basis that it impeded the right to 
contract.38 The Court simply found—through thoughtful factual inquiry—
that the hourly limitations did not actually further the government’s 
purported objectives and therefore exceeded the power of the state to 
infringe upon the right to contract.39
so often suggested). 
33 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53. Bakers were prohibited from working more than ten hours in a day, 
and more than sixty hours in a week. Id.
34 Id. The treatment of something like the liberty of contract as a fundamental right first appeared 
in Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 590–93 (1897) (striking down a statute that prohibited a 
Louisiana citizen from contracting for marine insurance with a New York insurance company that was 
not licensed to do business in the state). During this time the Supreme Court recognized a very broad 
definition of liberty under the Due Process Clause. Jackson, supra note 24, at 510. 
35 Id. at 511. 
36 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 60–63. 
37 Id. at 62-63. The Court noted that one inference from the government’s justifications for the 
bakeshop laws was that one could draw a distinction between the healthfulness of bread baked by a 
person who works only ten hours a day and that of bread baked by a person who works eleven hours a 
day. Id. The bread baked by the latter—according to the government’s logic—was no longer healthful or 
fit to be sold to the public. Id. The Court found this distinction to be “unreasonable and entirely 
arbitrary.” Id.
38  Neily, supra note 1, at 903. 
39 Id. The Court was also appropriately suspicious of the legislative intent behind the bakeshop 
laws. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 62 (“The connection, if any exists, is too shadowy and thin to build any 
argument for the interference of the legislature.”); id. at 63 (“It gives rise to at least a suspicion that there 
was some other motive dominating the legislature than the purpose to serve the public health or 
welfare.”). The union-backed Bakeshop Act was passed in 1895. David E. Bernstein, Lochner v. New 
York: A Centennial Retrospective, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1469, 1482 (2005). The historical evidence 
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In the following thirty years or so, the Court used the approach in 
Lochner to both strike down and uphold wage and hour restrictions.40 But 
by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,41 the Court made clear that it was no 
longer willing to meaningfully protect any economic right––let alone the 
unenumerated right to contract––from government interference.42
Considering a minimum wage regulation for women and children, the Court 
determined that the law was a reasonable, non-arbitrary, and non-
discriminatory means of regulating the relationships between employers 
and the employed.43 In this final case of the Lochner era, the Court 
expressed its vision of the proper role of the judiciary with regard to 
economic regulation: The courts are “both incompetent and unauthorized to 
deal” with assessing the “adequacy or practicability of the law enacted.”44
Therefore, the Court maintained, the legislature was the only appropriate 
arbiter of the wisdom or necessity of economic regulations, and “every 
plausible presumption is in favor of [their] validity.”45
The presumption of constitutionality for economic regulation became 
firmly established in United States v. Carolene Products.46 The Court 
indicates that the Bakeshop Act was passed primarily as an effort to protect large, unionized bakeries 
against competition from small, immigrant enterprises. Id. at 1476. The growing number of Italian, 
French, and Jewish immigrant bakeries posed a substantial business threat because they were able to 
produce comparable products at lower prices. Id. This was primarily because the immigrants set up old-
fashioned bakeries in the basements of cheap tenement buildings and their employees were on call 
nearly twenty-four hours a day, often sleeping on the floors of the bakery. Id. at 1477. 
40  Just three years after Lochner, the Supreme Court reached the opposite result for similar 
legislation that applied only to women. Using the same Lochner analysis in Muller v. Oregon, the Court 
found that minimum wage and weekly hour limits for women in certain industrial-type workplaces, like 
laundries and factories, were constitutional. 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908). The Court considered a number 
of scientific and sociological studies about the supposed limited physical abilities of women and 
potential injurious effects of long working hours on the health of women and their offspring and found 
that the state provided enough evidence to show that the regulations furthered the state’s legitimate 
interest in protecting women’s physical well-being. Id. at 420. Fifteen years after Muller, the Supreme 
Court invalidated a similar law fixing the minimum wage for women and children in the District of 
Columbia. In Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of District of Columbia, the Court emphasized the passing of 
the Nineteenth Amendment, which granted women the right to vote, as an indication that the “ancient 
inequality of the sexes . . . has continued with diminishing intensity.” 261 U.S. 525, 552 (1923). The 
Court no longer accepted the notion that adult women should be subjected to laws and regulations that 
restricted their right to contract when the same restrictions could not be imposed upon adult men under 
similar circumstances. Id. Minimum wage and hour regulations may have imposed permissible 
restrictions on women’s liberty of contract at a time when women were essentially second-class citizens, 
but any rationality disappeared once other rights and responsibilities of women were clearly established. 
Id. at 553. 
41  W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
42 Id. at 392. 
43 Id. at 397. 
44 Id. at 398 (quoting Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537–38 (1934)). 
45 Id.
46 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
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acknowledged that a challenger may produce evidence to overcome the 
presumption, but maintained that where the propriety of legislation is “at 
least debatable,” the dispute should be resolved in favor of the 
government.47 The Court tucked into the famous “Footnote Four” the 
foundation for the tiered approach to judicial constitutional review.48
Carolene’s footnote is recognized for enabling the Court to serve as a 
champion of civil rights by creating heightened judicial scrutiny for 
legislation “affecting discrete and insular minorities.”49 The footnote also 
had the effect of relegating economic liberty to a lower echelon of 
constitutional importance––a status that persists today.50 But, as detailed in 
the following section, Carolene is crucial precedent for the proposition that 
an economic regulation’s constitutionality must be evaluated with regard to 
the factual circumstances that exist at the time the law is challenged. 
In Williamson v. Lee Optical, the Court rendered the presumption of 
constitutionality virtually irrebuttable.51 The State of Oklahoma passed a 
number of laws regulating the visual care industry.52 The law made it illegal 
for opticians to take old lenses and place them into new frames, or use a 
device to measure the strength of an existing prescription to fabricate new 
lenses, unless the wearer first visited a licensed ophthalmologist or 
optometrist to obtain a prescription.53 Not only did this require customers to 
take an additional, costly step before they were able to upgrade their 
outdated or broken frames, but it substantially reduced business for 
opticians while preserving a virtual monopoly for ophthalmologists.54
The district court in Williamson v. Lee Optical undertook a thorough 
and searching inquiry into the effects and apparent motivation of the 
legislature in enacting the regulations and found that they bore no rational 
relationship to the government’s proffered purpose of protecting the public 
welfare, health, and safety.55 But the Supreme Court reversed, establishing 
47 Id. at 154. 
48 Id. at 152–153 n.4. 
49 See Felix Gilman, The Famous Footnote Four: A History of the Carolene Products Footnote,
46 S. TEX. L. REV. 163, 165–67 (2004). 
50 Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152–53 n.4. Carolene is far less known for its subsequent history 
and the dictum that would be later used to strike down the same legislation that Carolene upheld. See
Milnot Co. v. Richardson, 350 F. Supp. 221 (S.D. Ill. 1972). 
51 See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla. Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
52 Id. at 486. 
53 Id.
54 Randy E. Barnett, Keynote Remarks: Judicial Engagement Through the Lens of Lee Optical, 
19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 845 (2012) (describing the historical circumstances surrounding Williamson v. 
Lee Optical, including the protectionist motives behind many of Louisiana’s regulations of the visual 
care industry). 
55  Lee Optical of Okla., Inc. v. Williamson, 120 F. Supp. 128 (W.D. Okla. 1954), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part sub nom., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla. Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). The district court 
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the “rubber stamp” rational basis review that survives today.56 The Court 
determined that a law would be upheld as long as the government might 
have had any conceivable rationale for enacting the legislation as a way to 
correct a perceived evil.57 Although the plaintiff had convincingly negated 
all of the state’s alleged rationales for enacting the laws, the Supreme Court 
helpfully hypothesized several additional reasons that the government had 
never even suggested.58 If rational basis review was not deferential enough, 
the Court was now practically joining the government’s legal team. 
A few Supreme Court decisions since Williamson v. Lee Optical have 
affirmed and further refined this extremely deferential version of rational 
basis review––virtually refining the test out of existence. In modern rational 
basis review, the government is relieved of any obligation to prove that the 
legislative means actually further their purported ends. And the courts have 
no duty to conduct any meaningful factual analysis into the rationality of 
economic regulations.59
When it comes to non-economic rights and non-suspect classes, the 
Supreme Court has not always applied rational basis review consistently.
Some modern cases, in which the Court invalidated legislation under 
rational basis review, have stirred up questions about how rational basis 
review is applied and given some hope to those who wish for a more 
found that an exemption for the sellers of ready-to-wear lenses, in particular, completely undermined the 
state’s assertion that the measures would protect eyewear consumers. Id. at 138 (“The legislature must 
not blow hot and cold!”). The court held that the law violated both the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 143. 
56 Williamson, 348 U.S. at 488. 
57 Id. (“It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that 
the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.”). 
58 Id. at 487 (“The legislature might have concluded that the frequency of occasions when a 
prescription is necessary was sufficient to justify this regulation of the fitting of eyeglasses. Likewise, 
when it is necessary to duplicate a lens, a written prescription may or may not be necessary. But the 
legislature might have concluded that one was needed often enough to require one in every case. Or the 
legislature may have concluded that eye examinations were so critical, not only for correction of vision 
but also for detection of latent ailments or diseases, that every change in frames and every duplication of 
a lens should be accompanied by a prescription from a medical expert.”). 
59 See FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) (“[A] legislative choice is not 
subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or 
empirical data.”); Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (“A State . . . has no obligation to 
produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory classification.”); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf 
Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981) (“Where there was evidence before the legislature reasonably 
supporting the classification, litigants may not procure invalidation of the legislation merely by 
tendering evidence in court that the legislature was mistaken.”); R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 
166, 179 (1980) (Under rational basis review, “it is constitutionally irrelevant [what] reasoning in fact 
underlay the legislative decision.”) (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612 (1960)). But see 
Schware v. Bd. of Bar. Exam’rs, 353 U.S. 232 (holding that the state’s denial of a bar application for 
prior arrest record, use of aliases, and past Communist Party membership was not rationally related to 
the applicant’s current fitness to practice law and violated the Due Process Clause). 
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searching and exacting judiciary.60 What many of these cases have in 
common is that the Court identified discriminatory animus against a 
politically unfavored group as the pretextual motivation behind the 
government’s alleged legitimate purposes.61 These cases did not involve 
economic regulations; however, they reveal that the Supreme Court has not 
completely renounced the idea that a challenger, armed with the right set of 
facts and circumstances, can still overcome the strong presumption of 
constitutionality that accompanies rational basis review.  
A handful of recent decisions from lower federal courts and state 
courts of last resort have indicated an increased willingness to actually 
review the rationality of the factual justifications (or lack thereof) for 
economic regulations. Courts have invalidated restrictions on casket sales,62
hair braiding,63 eyebrow threading,64 pest control,65 liquor sales,66 shoeshine 
operations,67 and livery services.68 Whether the Supreme Court would ever 
60 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (invalidating Texas anti-sodomy law); 
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating Colorado state constitutional amendment that 
banned anti-discrimination laws on the basis of sexual orientation); City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne 
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (invalidating city’s ordinance excluding group homes for the 
intellectually disabled); Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95 (1989) (invalidating state law requirement that 
party own real property in order to be appointed to government board); Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. 
Cnty. Comm’n, 488 U.S. 336 (1989); Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14 (1985); Hooper v. Bernalillo 
Cnty. Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985); Metropolitan Life Ins. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985); Plyler v. 
Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 
U.S. 528 (1973); see also Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976) (noting that rational basis review 
is not “toothless”). The scrutiny utilized in these cases has been dubbed “rational basis review with 
bite.”
61 E.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583 (homosexuals); Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446 (intellectually 
disabled individuals); Quinn, 491 U.S. at 107 (non-real property owners); Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534 
(hippies). One reason for extending greater judicial protection to these groups is that they are likely to be 
politically powerless and “cannot themselves mandate the desired political responses” to eliminate 
legislation that negatively impacts them. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446. 
62 See St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 2013); Craigmiles v. Giles, 213 F.3d 
220 (6th Cir. 2002). 
63 See Brantley v. Kuntz, 98 F. Supp. 3d 884 (W.D. Tex. 2015); Clayton v. Steinagel, 885 F. 
Supp. 2d 1212 (D. Utah 2012); Cornwell v. Hamilton, 80 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (S.D. Cal. 1999). But see 
Bah v. Atty. Gen. of Tenn., 610 F. App’x 547 (6th Cir. 2015); Diwara v. State Bd. of Cosmetology, 852 
A.2d 1279 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004). 
64 See Patel v. Texas Dep’t of Licensing and Reg., 469 S.W.3d 69 (Tex. 2016). But see 
JuStringz-Century III Mall v. Bureau of Prof’l and Occupational Affairs, State Bd. of Costmetology, 22 
A.3d 298 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2011). 
65 See Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2008). 
66 See Maxwell’s Pic-Pac, Inc. v. Dehner, 887 F. Supp. 2d 733 (W.D. Ky. 2012), aff’d in part 
and rev’d in part, Maxwell’s Pic-Pac, Inc. v. Dehner, 739 F.3d 936 (6th Cir. 2014) (favorable equal 
protection claim reversed on appeal). 
67 See Barry v. Brown, 710 F. Supp. 352, 355–56 (D.D.C. 1989). 
68 See Santos v. City of Houston, 80 F. Supp. 601 (S.D. Tex. 1994); see also Bokhari v. Metro. 
Gov’t, No. 3:11-00088, 2012 WL 162372 (M.D. Tenn. 2012). But see Speed’s Auto Servs. v. City of 
Portland, No. 3:12-CV-738-AC, 2013 WL 1826141 (D. Or. 2012); Leib v. Hillsborough Cnty. Pub. 
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be willing to scale back its deferential stance on economic regulation is 
open to speculation, but an emerging circuit split over whether naked 
economic protectionism, with nothing more, is a legitimate state interest 
could provide an opportunity for the Court to further define the limits of the 
government’s power to interfere with economic liberties.69
What the cases in the preceding two paragraphs illustrate is that 
rational basis review––even in its highly deferential state––still entails 
drawing logical connections that are grounded in real-world, factual 
circumstances. The Court has never endorsed an approach that permits the 
government to produce “merely fanciful” justifications for economic 
regulation.70 And as one district court noted: “Even the minimal rational 
basis test does not require the court to muse endlessly about [a] regulation’s 
conceivable objectives nor to ‘manufacture justifications’ for its continued 
existence.”71 With confidence that facts still matter in rational basis review, 
the following section considers what happens when facts change. 
CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The Supreme Court has consistently articulated the principle that laws 
can have a “constitutional shelf life.”72 In several areas of constitutional 
law, and at every level of judicial scrutiny, the Court has demonstrated that 
a law’s constitutionality should be evaluated with regard to the factual 
circumstances in existence at the time the law is challenged. But in the 
seventy-eight years since Carolene, which established the modern, highly 
deferential rational basis review, the only rational basis review cases the 
Court has reviewed have involved recently enacted legislation.73 Thus, the 
Court has not yet had an opportunity to reaffirm and clarify the role of the 
changed circumstances doctrine in rational basis review. As a result, the 
lower courts have diverged over whether and how the changed 
circumstances doctrine should be applied in rational basis review cases.74
Transp. Comm’n, 558 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2009). 
69 See infra note 232. 
70  Lee Optical of Okla., Inc. v. Williamson, 120 F. Supp. 128, 134 n.10 (W.D. Okla. 1954). 
71 Brown, 710 F. Supp. at 356 (quoting Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 520 (1975) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting)). 
72 See Larsen, supra note 19, at 60 n.17.
73 See Heffner v. Murphy Petition, supra note 17, at *14. Of the 150 rational basis review cases 
that the Supreme Court decided since Carolene Products, all were challenges to recently enacted 
legislation. Id.
74 See, e.g., Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56, 62 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 220 
(2014); Dias v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 567 F.3d 1169 (10th Cir. 2009); Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. 
Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Reg., 763 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1985); Murillo v. Bambrick, 681 F.2d 898 (3d Cir. 
1982); Jones v. Schneiderman, 888 F. Supp. 2d 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Santos v. City of Houston, 80 F. 
Supp. 601 (S.D. Tex. 1994); Milnot Co. v. Richardson, 350 F. Supp. 221 (S.D. Ill. 1972); Peck v. Fink, 
2 F.2d 912 (D.C. Cir. 1924); Colorado v. Albrecht, 358 P.2d 4 (Colo. 1960); Conner v. Cone, 235 So. 2d 
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The Changed Circumstances Doctrine Defined 
It is critical to first define precisely what the changed circumstances 
doctrine is and what it is not. The changed circumstances doctrine requires 
a court to evaluate the relevant factual circumstances (from the record or by 
judicial notice75) and their relation to a fixed constitutional principle to 
determine whether that principle was violated.76 This analytical approach 
utilizes the current standard of constitutional analysis at the time of the 
challenge––for example, an economic law must bear a rational relationship 
to a legitimate government purpose. The court applies the current standard 
to the relevant factual circumstances to establish legitimacy or illegitimacy, 
rationality or irrationality.77 The changed circumstances doctrine accounts 
for the possibility that the relevant factual circumstances could change in 
such a way as to cause a constitutional law to cross into unconstitutionality. 
This is distinct from living constitutionalism, which presumes that 
constitutional rules can change in response to changes in the relevant 
factual or societal circumstances.78 Some Supreme Court decisions have 
used changed or changing circumstances––as evidenced by social values,79
sociological data,80 or foreign and international law81––as justifications for 
creating or altering existing constitutional rules.82 That is not the approach 
that is described or advocated here.83 While those same considerations 
492 (Fla. 1970); Georgia S. & Fla. R.R. v. Seven-Up Bottling Co. of Se. Ga., 175 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 1965); 
Wegan v. Village of Lexington, 309 N.W.2d 273 (Minn. 1981); Caruso v. Aluminum Co. of America, 
473 N.E.2d 818 (Ohio 1984). 
75 See Larsen, supra note 19, at 72. 
76 See id. at 60–61; see also Williamson, supra note 19, at 604–05. 
77 See Larsen, supra note 19, at 70–76, for an interesting discussion on the role of facts in 
judicial review. See also DONALD FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED THEORY OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS (2008). 
78 See Larsen, supra note 19, at 60–61. 
79 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (citing shifting attitudes toward homosexuality 
as justification for overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), which upheld anti-sodomy 
laws). Hinging constitutional rules on abstract social concepts can be problematic: such concepts are 
difficult, if not impossible, to define with any certainty and can change very quickly. See Williamson, 
supra note 19, at 604–05. 
80 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (citing sociological studies about the impacts 
of “separate but equal” education policies on black children as justification for overruling Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)). 
81 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (using international law to bolster arguments that 
the death penalty for seventeen-year-olds violated the Eighth Amendment and overruling Stanford v. 
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989)); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 576 (“[T]he reasoning and 
holding in Bowers have been rejected elsewhere. . . . Other nations . . . have taken action consistent with 
an affirmation of the protected right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct.”). 
82 See generally DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 1–6 (2010). 
83 This is by no means to suggest that the results of the cases cited supra notes 79–81 were 
incorrect or that the living Constitution method of analysis is unprincipled or wrong. Cases that utilize 
this approach are simply irrelevant to the changed circumstances doctrine and beyond the scope of this 
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could be relevant in a changed circumstances analysis, lower courts are not 
at liberty to disturb binding Supreme Court constitutional precedent or 
define new expansions or limitations of constitutional rights.84 The only 
objective of the changed circumstances doctrine is to determine the 
constitutionality of the regulation at issue, within the existing constitutional 
precedential framework, but in light of the relevant factual circumstances 
that exist at the time the regulation is challenged. 
Under the changed circumstances doctrine, a law’s “shelf life” can be 
reached in one of two ways: the factual circumstances underlying the 
government’s interests are temporary and cease to exist, or changes in 
factual circumstances sever the relationship between the government’s 
interests and the means used to further them.85 In most rational basis review 
changed circumstances cases, it is generally the second part of this inquiry 
that is in dispute. With respect to economic regulation, the government 
virtually always asserts an interest in protecting the public health, safety, 
and welfare.86 Articulated generally, these are enduring state objectives that 
are unlikely to disappear over time and will always be considered a 
legitimate government interest.87 Thus, the question most open for 
challenge in economic changed circumstances cases is whether––in light of 
the factual circumstances that exist at the time of the challenge––the law is 
still rationally related to protecting the public health, safety, and welfare.  
The Changed Circumstances Doctrine and Rational Basis Review 
The changed circumstances doctrine has been a part of the Supreme 
Court’s rational basis review jurisprudence since the early twentieth 
century. Justice Holmes recognized that unforeseen changes in the facts 
justifying a law might require its invalidation, even if it was valid when 
enacted.88 Other Justices echoed this principle. “[A] police regulation, 
comment. For more on the complex and fascinating debate about living constitutionalism versus 
originalism, see, for example, ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAW 3–48 (1997); STRAUSS, supra note 82; Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the 
Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 549 (2009); Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed 
Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395 (1995). 
84  Also beyond the scope of this Comment is a discussion of the tension between stare decisis 
and the originalist interpretative method. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
854–63 (1992); Nelson Lund, Stare Decisis and Originalism: Judicial Disengagement from the Supreme 
Court’s Errors, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1029 (2012). This Comment presumes, for the purposes of the 
changed circumstances doctrine, that existing constitutional rules and principles are valid and binding. 
85 See Williamson, supra note 19, at 606. 
86 See generally Florman, supra note 1; Neily, supra note 1; Sandefur, Equality of Opportunity,
supra note 1. 
87 See generally id.
88 See Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 547–48 (1924) (“A law depending upon the 
existence of an emergency or other certain state of facts to uphold it may cease to operate if the 
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although valid when made,” Justice Hughes explained, “may become, by 
reason of later events, arbitrary and confiscatory in operation.”89 And 
Justice Brandeis stated, “A statute valid as to one set of facts may be invalid 
as to another. A statute valid when enacted may become invalid by change 
in the conditions to which it applied.”90
One of the clearest expressions of the changed circumstances doctrine 
comes from one of the most important economic cases in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence.91 In addition to setting the stage for tiered scrutiny and 
establishing the strong presumption of constitutionality for economic 
regulation, Carolene confirmed the Court’s previous declarations that a 
rational law could become irrational over time.92 The Court explained that 
when a statute is justified by specific factual circumstances, it could be 
found unconstitutional once those factual circumstances no longer exist.93
The Carolene Court reviewed a conviction under the Filled Milk Act, 
a federal law that prohibited the interstate sale of milk with added vegetable 
or coconut oils.94 Noting that the law could be upheld “wholly on the 
presumption of constitutionality,” the Court nevertheless reviewed the 
evidence provided by the government to support its prohibition.95 The 
government contended that filled milk was “generally injurious to the 
public health and facilitated fraud upon the public” because it did not have 
the same levels of vitamins found in whole milk products.96 Therefore, 
according to the government, there was a substantial risk that children 
might be fed the filled milk and deprived of nutrients essential to growth 
and development.97 The Filled Milk Act was easily upheld. 
Carolene is much more well-known for its footnote than its subsequent 
history.98 After two losses at the Supreme Court, the Carolene Products 
emergency ceases or the facts change even though valid when passed.”). In Chastleton, the Supreme 
Court considered the constitutionality of a temporary, emergency rent control statute in the District of 
Columbia. When the legislature reenacted the law based only on a legislative finding that the emergency 
conditions were still present, Holmes declined to accept the government’s “prophecy” and remanded for 
fact-finding on whether the emergency conditions still existed. Six months later, a lower court declared 
that the emergency had ended and invalidated the statute. See Peck v. Fink, 2 F.2d 912 (D.D.C. 1924). 
89  Abie State Bank v. Weaver 282 U.S. 765, 772 (1931). 
90  Nashville, C. & St. L. R.R. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 415 (1935) (footnote omitted). 
91 See supra notes 46–50 and accompanying text. 
92 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938); see also Milnot Co. v. 
Richardson, 350 F. Supp. 221 (S.D. Ill. 1972). 
93 Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 153. The Court cited Chastleton Corporation v. Sinclair, 264 
U.S. 543 (1924), to support the proposition. See supra note 88. 
94 Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 146–47.
95 Id. at 148–49, 49 n.2. 
96 Id. at 149 n.2, 150 n.3. 
97 Id.
98 See generally Gilman, supra note 49; Geoffrey P. Miller, The True Story of Carolene Products,
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Company changed its name to the Milnot Company and continued to sell 
filled milk on an intrastate basis in the states where it was produced, so as 
to avoid prosecution under the Filled Milk Act.99 Twenty-eight years later, 
Milnot waged one more constitutional attack against the Filled Milk Act in 
federal district court.100 Milnot produced evidence that since 1944, a variety 
of imitation milk and dairy products––functionally indistinct from the 
product sold by Milnot––had emerged on the market, and the government 
permitted their distribution in interstate commerce.101 The government had 
contended in Carolene that prohibiting the sale of filled milk was targeted 
at correcting a very specific evil––preventing malnutrition in children from 
consuming nutritionally inferior imitation dairy products.102 Milnot now 
argued that the broad availability of those products at the time of the 
challenge severed any rational connection between preventing malnutrition 
in children and prohibiting Milnot’s products.103 The court agreed that the 
government’s continued enforcement of the Filled Milk Act against Milnot 
was irrational.104
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals also recognized the viability of the 
changed circumstances doctrine in reversing the dismissal of a substantive 
due process challenge to the city of Denver’s pit bull ban.105 The plaintiffs 
conceded that the city of Denver possessed a legitimate interest in animal 
control as a means to preserve the health and safety of the public, but 
maintained that the city’s chosen means––a pit bull ban enacted twenty 
years earlier––was no longer rationally related to achieving that interest.106
The challengers presented evidence from breeding standards that the 
prohibited dog breeds made excellent family pets and were not significantly 
more dangerous than many other non-prohibited breeds.107 The district 
court had granted the city’s motion to dismiss, citing older case law from 
other jurisdictions that upheld similar bans.108 The Tenth Circuit reversed, 
emphasizing that the plaintiff’s specific argument was that “although pit 
1987 S. CT. REV. 397 (1987). 
99   Milnot Co. v. Richardson, 350 F. Supp. 221, 222–23 (S.D. Ill. 1972). 
100 Id. at 221. 
101 Id. at 224. 
102 Carolene, 304 U.S. 144, 149 n.2, 150 n.3. 
103 Milnot, 350 F. Supp. at 222–23. 
104 Id. at 224 (“[T]he dairy market conditions and dangers of confusion which led to the passage 
and judicial upholding of the Filled Milk Act many years ago . . . have long since ceased to exist.”). The 
court relied on Chastleton Corporation v. Sinclair, which is the case that the Carolene Court relied on 
for the same proposition. Id.; see also Carolene, 304 U.S. at 153; Chastleton Corporation v. Sinclair, 
264 U.S. 543, 547–48 (1924). 
105  Dias v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 567 F.3d 1169 (10th Cir. 2009). 
106 Id.
107 Id. at 1184. 
108 Id.
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bull bans sustained twenty years ago may have been justified by the then-
existing body of knowledge, the state of science in 2009 is such that the 
bans are no longer rational.”109
One court utilized the changed circumstances doctrine to ferret out an 
original, illegitimate purpose of a statute. In Santos v. City of Houston, the 
plaintiff challenged a seventy-year-old Houston ordinance that banned 
private vans (jitneys) carrying fifteen people or more on public streets.110
Since the ban’s enactment, a number of virtually identical services had 
begun to operate in the city––van pools, ride sharing services, air transport 
vans, and the like.111 The government contended that the jitney ban served 
current objectives of safety and unimpeded traffic flow, an argument that 
the court found unavailing in light of the many similar vehicles that could 
freely operate on public streets.112 After dismissing as irrational the offered 
justifications for furthering legitimate purposes, the court examined 
evidence of the original motivation behind the ban––to eliminate 
competition against the streetcar industry.113 Such a purpose is not only 
arguably illegitimate,114 but also irrelevant, since streetcars had long ceased 
to operate on Houston’s streets.115 “[E]ven if the ordinance ever had a 
purpose, legitimate or not,” the court said, “its utility has passed.”116
The changed circumstances doctrine is almost necessary when a statute 
is so old that it is not even possible to find any evidence of its original 
purpose. In Brown v. Barry, a “shoeshine entrepreneur” began providing 
showers, training, shoeshine kits, and employment to homeless persons in 
the District of Columbia.117 He operated successfully and without incident 
for several years under a general vendor permit.118 In a sudden change of 
course, the District revoked his permit for violating an eighty-three-year-old 
municipal ordinance, which provided that “no permit shall be issued for a 
bootblack [shoeshine] stand on public space.”119 Unable to produce any 
relevant legislative history for the ordinance, the government speculated 
that the ban could have been intended to reduce litter or prevent 
impediments to sidewalk pedestrian traffic.120 The court found these 
109 Id. at 1183. 
110 Santos v. City of Hous., 80 F. Supp. 601 (S.D. Tex. 1994). 
111 Id. at 602. 
112 Id. at 608. 
113 Id.
114 See infra note 232. 
115 Santos, 80 F. Supp. at 608. 
116 Id. at 608–09. 
117  Brown v. Barry, 710 F. Supp. 352 (D.D.C. 1989). 
118 Id. at 352. 
119 Id. 352–53.
120 Id. at 355. 
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justifications unavailing since there was no evidence that the shoeshines 
took up more space than larger, permitted vendors such as fruit stands.121
The court noted that “the District has not articulated the belief that there is a 
continuing validity or life to this regulation in the present context.”122 Given 
the lack of any articulable rational basis for distinguishing shoeshines from 
other vendors, the court found the ordinance unconstitutional.123
The Supreme Court has not always been receptive to constitutional 
challenges based on changed circumstances. In Brotherhood of Locomotive 
Firemen and Enginemen v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad, the 
Court reviewed “full-crew laws,” which dictated the size and personnel 
makeup of train crews.124 The Court had upheld the law against challenges 
when they were first enacted at the beginning of the century, but almost 
fifty years later, a changed circumstances argument was brought to the 
table.125 The challengers presented considerable evidence that technological 
advancements and the increasing obsolescence of certain railroad jobs 
meant that the old laws overestimated the crew size necessary to operate the 
trains.126
The plaintiffs prevailed in the district court, but the Supreme Court did 
not accept their changed circumstances arguments. The Court noted that the 
evidence regarding the need for full crews was still mixed or inconclusive 
and railroad laws had been the subject of disputes and “legislative re-
evaluation” for many years.127 In light of this ongoing political conflict and 
inconclusive evidence, the Court said, it was inappropriate for the judiciary 
to intervene and deem the laws outdated.128 The district court’s findings of 
fact regarding the law’s obsolescence, according to the Court, was an 
improper usurpation of democratic judgment.129 Resolution of ongoing 
political conflicts, the Court said, may be “fixed only by the people acting 
through their elected representatives.”130
It is important to note that although the Court explicitly rejected the 
plaintiff’s changed circumstances argument in this particular case, the Court 
did not overrule its earlier changed circumstances cases or indicate that 
constitutional inquiries must only be limited to the factual circumstances 
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 356. 
124 See Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R.R., 393 U.S. 
129 (1968). 
125 Id. at 131. 
126 Id. at 135. 
127 Id. at 136. 
128 Id. at 133–34. 
129 Id. at 138. 
130 Id.
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that existed at the time of enactment. Thus, Brotherhood might best be 
viewed as discouraging—but not precluding––the changed circumstances 
doctrine as defined in Carolene.
Although Carolene’s rule regarding changed circumstances was 
unambiguous, lower courts have been led astray by other language in 
Carolene’s more general discussion about judicial deference to legislative 
judgment, as well as later, inapposite Supreme Court rational basis review 
cases. Practical concerns, such as institutional costs and the limited 
competency of courts to ascertain and weigh facts, have also played a role 
in some courts’ abandonment of the changed circumstances doctrine.  
In Murillo v. Bambrick, the Third Circuit held that New Jersey’s 
imposition of trial fees upon individuals undergoing divorces, but not on 
other civil litigants, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.131 The 
divorce trial fees had originally served to offset the costs of the special 
masters used in divorce proceedings. After the special master requirement 
was abolished and the stated adopted no-fault divorce, the challengers 
argued that the fees lost any rational relationship to offsetting the costs of 
divorce proceedings.132 The court conducted a standard rational basis 
review analysis and upheld the statute.133
The court declined to adopt a changed circumstances analysis because, 
it said, “the Supreme Court appears not to have determined definitively 
whether changed conditions are a relevant consideration.”134 The Murillo 
court compared the changed circumstances language from Carolene with 
language from two of the Supreme Court’s rational basis review cases. In 
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, the Court declared, “Where there was 
evidence before the legislature reasonably supporting the classification, 
litigants may not procure invalidation of the legislation merely by tendering 
evidence that the legislature was mistaken.”135 And in Lindsley v. Natural 
Carbonic Gas Co., the Court said that “if any state of facts reasonably can 
be conceived that would sustain [a statute], the existence of that state of 
facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed.”136 The Third 
Circuit interpreted these two statements to preclude a changed 
circumstances constitutional analysis, but conceded that “[t]here may be a 
role for the courts to play when a statute, rendered manifestly unreasonable 
by changed conditions, remains in effect for many years without legislative 
131  Murillo v. Bambrick, 681 F.2d 898 (3d Cir. 1982). 
132 Id. 900–01.
133 Id. at 908. 
134 Id. at 912 n.27. 
135  Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981).
136  Lindsley v. Nat. Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). 
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actions.”137
The Murillo court also gave a non-legal justification for abandoning 
the changed circumstances doctrine. It was concerned about institutional 
costs that the changed circumstances doctrine could impose on the 
government.138 By invalidating laws that were valid when originally 
enacted, but grounded on assumptions that were later found incorrect, the 
courts would be effectively imposing an affirmative obligation on the 
legislature.139 To avoid the judicial intervention and invalidation of laws, 
the legislature would have to “constantly reassess the continuing validity of 
the factual premises underlying each piece of legislation enacted over the 
years” in order to discover and correct the alleged error.140 In the present 
case, the court noted, only nine years had passed from the time the statute 
was enacted and the time of the challenge, which provided little opportunity 
for the legislature to complete such a process.141
The Third Circuit recently confirmed its renouncement of the changed 
circumstances doctrine in a challenge to Pennsylvania’s funeral industry 
regulations, which date back to 1952.142 In Heffner v. Murphy, the plaintiffs 
sought to invalidate of a number of arcane laws, including a requirement 
that all funeral homes maintain preparation rooms, and a prohibition on 
serving food and drinks in funeral homes.143 The district court held that 
some of the regulations were outdated, irrational, and now appeared to 
serve only economically protectionist purposes.144 The Third Circuit 
reversed, rejecting the lower court’s consideration of changed 
circumstances.145 Citing the highly deferential nature of rational basis 
review, the Third Circuit declared that although “certain provisions of 
[Pennsylvania’s funeral industry law] are antiquated in light of how funeral 
homes now operate[,] . . . [t]hat is not . . . a constitutional flaw.”146
137 Id. at 912. 




142 Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56, 62–64 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 220 (2014).
143 Id.
144 See Heffner v. Murphy, 866 F. Supp. 2d 358, 429 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (“[W]e admonish the 
[Funeral Board] to apply appropriate focus and craft, or clarify, regulations that appropriately govern the 
funeral industry in this, the twenty-first century.”).
145 Heffner, 745 F.3d at 62. 
146 Id. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Heffner v. Murphy, declining to clarify whether 
rational basis review requires a court to evaluate the rationality of a law’s enforcement under current 
factual circumstances, or only the factual circumstances that existed at the time the law was enacted—no 
matter how long ago the law was enacted or how much the factual circumstances have changed since its 
enactment. See Heffner v. Murphy, 135 S. Ct. 220 (2014) (denying writ of certiorari); Heffner v. 
Murphy Petition, supra note 17, at *1. 
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The Ninth Circuit also considered the impact of changed 
circumstances on a Minnesota railroad regulation.147 In 1985, the 
Burlington Railroad Corporation challenged a turn of the century statute 
that compelled railroads to maintain station houses and staff in any town 
with a population of one thousand or more.148 The court defined the 
legitimate purpose of the statute as fostering “public convenience and 
necessity” by ensuring that towns received a minimum level of service.149
The railroad argued that the regulation no longer rationally served that 
interest because many of the duties that had been historically performed by 
service agents were now computerized and conducted in centralized service 
centers. Furthermore, Burlington argued, changes in freight practices meant 
that some of the smaller stations rarely handled any freight at all and did not 
need the same level of staffing as others.150 The court conducted a standard 
rational basis review analysis and held that, since the population 
requirements had been updated only sixteen years prior to the challenge, the 
railroad had not shown that circumstances had changed so drastically that 
the statute no longer possessed a rational basis.151
Citing Carolene, Lindsley, and Clover Leaf, the Ninth Circuit 
described the Supreme Court as being “ambivalent” about whether changed 
circumstances could transform a once-rational statute into an irrational 
law.152 Nevertheless, the court took it upon itself to declare that the time of 
a classification’s creation is the appropriate contextual reference point for 
the purposes of an equal protection rational basis review analysis.153
The District Court of the Southern District of New York recently 
followed the leads of Murillo and Burlington in rejecting the changed 
circumstances doctrine. In Jones v. Schneiderman, the court evaluated New 
York State’s prohibition of mixed martial arts (MMA) fighting under both 
equal protection and due process.154 New York banned MMA fighting in 
1996 on the grounds that it posed significant health and safety risks to the 
competitors and negatively influenced the public morality and youths of 
New York.155 The plaintiffs argued that significant changes in the rules and 
147  Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Reg., 763 F.2d 1106, 1108–09 (9th Cir. 1985). 
148 Id. at 1109. 
149 Id. at 1110. 
150 Id. at 1109. 
151 Id.
152 Id. at 1111. 
153 Id. at 1111 n.3 (“In construing statutory language, a court must ordinarily consider the 
circumstances at the time of passage, rather than later interpretations or statements of purpose. Where 
courts have invalidated archaic statutes, there is often an independent constitutional basis for doing so 
(i.e., a belated recognition that the statutes were unconstitutional as written).”) (citations omitted). 
154  Jones v. Schneiderman, 888 F. Supp. 2d 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
155 Id. at 422. 
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administration of professional MMA fighting turned a once violent, 
“anything goes” sport into something far safer and more appropriate for a 
broader mainstream audience.156 At the time of the lawsuit, the athletic 
commissions of forty-five other states had officially sanctioned MMA 
fighting, which the plaintiffs argued was proof that the sport was far safer 
and no longer posed substantial threats to the public welfare.157 The court 
cited to Clover Leaf and held that the prohibition of MMA was both rational 
at the time it was adopted and rational at the time that it was enforced, 
despite the substantial discrepancies in the factual circumstances between 
the two.158
Outside of the substantive due process and equal protection context, 
but still within rational basis review, some litigants have invoked the 
changed circumstances doctrine to challenge federal criminal drug 
sentences, alleging that new evidence proves that the justifications 
underlying the laws were incorrect. Criminal defendants have asserted––so 
far with no success––equal protection challenges to the federal mandatory 
minimum sentences under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, which punish crack 
cocaine offenses 100 times more severely than powder cocaine offenses.159
The Second and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals both considered 
changed circumstances arguments against the mandatory minimum crack 
offense sentences, but declined to use changed circumstances as a reason to 
invalidate the laws. In United States v. Then, the Second Circuit rejected a 
defendant’s equal protection challenge to his crack conviction sentence and 
declined to consider the changed circumstances doctrine.160 In a 
concurrence, Judge Calabresi grappled with the relevance of considerable 
emerging research that showed crack did not pose a substantially greater 
threat than cocaine to users or to society, as well as evidence of its 
profoundly disparate impact on minorities.161 Although Calabresi did not 
believe that the evidence at the time compelled the finding of an equal 
protection violation, he noted that if the evidence continued to develop, 
“constitutional arguments that were unavailing in the past may not be 
156 Id. at 423–24. 
157  New York, which had long been the only state that prohibited MMA, recently lifted the ban. 
See Damon Martin, New York Legalizes MMA After Nearly 20-Year Ban on the Sport, FOX SPORTS
(May 22, 2016, 6:30 PM), www.foxsports.com/ufc/story/ufc-new-york-legalizes-mma-after-nearly-20-
year-ban-on-the-sport-032216.
158 Schneiderman, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 425. 
159 See, e.g., United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Moore, 644 F.3d 
553 (7th Cir. 2011). 
160 Then, 56 F.3d at 466. The majority expressly disavowed Calabresi’s concurrence, which 
recognized the changed circumstances doctrine. 
161 Id. at 468 (Calabresi, J., concurring). 
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foreclosed in the future.”162 Calabresi cautioned, however, against 
“courts . . . step[ping] in [to] say that what was rational in the past has been 
made irrational by the passage of time, change of circumstances, or the 
availability of new knowledge.”163 Accounting for changed circumstances, 
Calabresi suggested, could lead to “hazardous” line-drawing in judicial 
decisions that should remain in the purview of the legislature.164
Since Then, few courts have embraced Calabresi’s prediction.165
Almost twenty years later, in United States v. Moore, the Seventh Circuit 
noted that the challenger’s evidence––a series of Sentencing Commission 
reports––indeed undermined many of Congress’s prior assumptions that 
crack cocaine was more addictive, more harmful, and caused more violence 
than cocaine in the powder form.166 However, the same reports also 
contained findings indicating that crack was still at least somewhat more 
dangerous than powder cocaine.167 Citing again to Carolene, the court 
determined that the factual evidence about crack and cocaine sentencing 
remains “at least debatable,” and the ultimate determination must be left to 
Congress.168 Although the court rejected Moore’s arguments, it 
acknowledged that a challenge based on changed circumstances could be a 
legitimate avenue for a constitutional attack.169
162 Id. at 467. Calabresi noted two relevant sources of changing factual evidence. First, the 
Sentencing Commission had conducted an investigation and found little evidence that crack was 
substantially more dangerous than cocaine. It also recommended that Congress eliminate the differential 
treatment of crack and cocaine. Second, statistical research revealed that the sentencing ratio disparately 
impacted minorities, who comprised the majority of crack users and distributors. Id. at 467–68. 
163 Id. at 468. 
164 Id. at 466–69. Calabresi also noted some interesting international comparisons to changed 
circumstances, and suggested that even if American courts do not immediately invalidate laws on the 
basis of changed circumstances, they might be able to provide notice when a statute or regulation 
appears to be approaching unconstitutionality. In Germany, for example, the Constitutional Court does 
not immediately strike down an outdated law that appears to be unconstitutional. Instead, it declares that 
the law is approaching unconstitutionality because of changed circumstances. This serves to put 
parliament on notice and allow time for review and reconsideration of the legislation before the Court 
completely nullifies it. Id.
165 See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 644 F.3d 553 (7th Cir. 2011). But see Kimbrough v. United 
States, 552 U.S. 85, 96–97 (2008) (Under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), a sentencing 
judge was permitted to deviate from 100-1 sentencing guidelines based on a “need to avoid unwarranted 
sentence disparities.”). 
166 Id. at 556–57. 
167 Id. at 557. 
168 Id. at 556. 
169 Id. More recently, plaintiffs have begun to wage challenges against the federal government’s 
classification of marijuana as a Schedule I drug, citing Carolene and presenting evidence to disprove 
Congress’s finding from forty-five years ago that marijuana possesses no medicinal benefit. See Larsen,
supra note 19, at 96. In addition to presenting new facts about current scientific understandings of 
marijuana’s effects on the body and medical usefulness, litigants have also argued that the federal 
government’s purpose is greatly diminished as states begin to legalize the drug. Id.
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The Changed Circumstances Doctrine Beyond Rational Basis Review 
In equal protection cases involving heightened levels of scrutiny, the 
Supreme Court routinely considers the impact of changed circumstances on 
the constitutionality of laws. In evaluating a race-conscious admissions 
policy in Grutter v. Bollinger, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized that 
there would be some future point at which the policy would no longer pass 
constitutional muster.170 If race-conscious admissions policies are 
successful in furthering the compelling interest of increasing diversity in 
higher education, it logically follows that diversity will eventually, 
hopefully, reach some intended or desirable level. When it does, the same 
policies would no longer be necessary for furthering the same purpose and 
would no longer be able to survive the strict scrutiny standard.171
The First Amendment has also proven fertile ground for challengers to 
allege unconstitutionality on the basis of changed factual circumstances. 
The changed circumstances doctrine has not served as an analytical tool in 
any of the Supreme Court’s majority opinions; however, the significance of 
factual change over time was squarely addressed by Justice Thomas, who 
recently discussed the issue in a dissent172 and concurrence.173 Changed 
circumstances were also integral in a First Amendment decision from the 
Second Circuit.174
In FCC v. Fox Television, the Court heard a challenge regarding 
agency regulations from the Federal Communication Commission (FCC).175
In the 1950s, the FCC promulgated various regulations in furtherance of the 
“fairness doctrine,” requiring broadcasters to provide equivalent on-air 
exposure for political candidates and allow for equal discussion from all 
sides of a political or public issue.176 The Supreme Court upheld the 
regulations against a First Amendment challenge in Red Lion Broadcasting 
170 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 341–42 (2003) (“We are mindful . . . that ‘[a] core purpose 
of the Fourteenth Amendment was to do away with all governmentally imposed discrimination based on 
race.’ Accordingly, race-conscious admissions policies must be limited in time.”) (citations omitted). 
171 Id. at 343 (“It has been 25 years since Justice Powell first approved the use of race to further 
an interest in student body diversity in the context of public higher education. Since that time, the 
number of minority applicants with high grades and test scores has indeed increased. We expect that 25 
years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved 
today.”). The Court stressed the delicate balance between the government’s interest and the means 
employed in the admissions policy, noting that “racial classifications, however compelling their goals, 
are potentially so dangerous that they may be employed no more broadly than the interest demands.” Id.
at 342. This suggests that even minor shifts in factual circumstances could impact constitutionality. 
172 See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 530–35 (2009) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting).
173 See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 243, 259–60 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
174 See TJS of New York, Inc. v. Smithtown, 598 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2010). 
175 Fox Television, 556 U.S. at 505. 
176  Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 398 U.S. 367 (1969). 
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v. FCC, citing the scarcity of the broadcast spectrum and the need for the 
government to “control . . . the cacophony of competing voices” as 
warranting the intrusion on free speech and expression.177 Since that time, 
the FCC has invoked spectrum scarcity to justify a wide array of broadcast 
regulations well beyond the fairness doctrine.178 Basing a constitutional rule 
on the nature of a broadcast medium practically invites challenges based on 
changed circumstances. Litigants have raised several challenges citing the 
anachronism of the spectrum scarcity rationale but the Court has yet to 
overrule Red Lion.179
Fox Television was not decided on constitutional grounds, but in his 
dissent, Justice Thomas expressed strong disagreement with Red Lion’s use 
of a “set of transitory facts” to define the lenient First Amendment 
protections for broadcasters.180 He noted that even if Red Lion applied an 
appropriate constitutional standard, the factual assumptions underlying the 
rule had been “eviscerated” by tremendous technological advances that had 
since developed.181 Television and radio are now supplemented by 
seemingly endless options over cable, satellite, and the internet. “These 
dramatic changes in factual circumstances,” Thomas said, “might well 
support a departure from precedent under the prevailing approach to stare
decisis.”182
Justice Thomas also considered changed circumstances in his 
concurrence in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition.183 The majority opinion 
invalidated a federal prohibition on “virtual child pornography,” which is 
sexually explicit material that appears to depict minors, but is produced 
using youthful looking adults or computer generated imagery, rather than 
actual children.184 Justice Thomas agreed that the ban could not be 
sustained under the First Amendment, but found one of the government’s 
arguments persuasive: Without the ban, people who possess and distributed 
177 Id. at 376. 
178  Larsen, supra note 19, at 89. 
179 See, e.g., Brief of Respondents NBC Universal, Inc. et al. at 32–38, FCC v. Fox Television 
Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009) (No. 07-582), 2008 WL 3153438, at *32–38; Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari at 14–20, Minority Television Project, Inc. v. FCC, 134 S. Ct. 2874 (2014) (No. 13-1124), 
2014 WL 1090035, at *14–20; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 16–23, Media Gen., Inc. v. FCC, 133 S. 
Ct. 63 (2011) (No. 11-691), 2011 WL 6069620, at *16–23; see also Thomas W. Hazlett et al., The
Overly Active Corpse of Red Lion, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 51, 53 (2010). 
180 Fox Television, 556 U.S. at 530 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Constitutional rights are enshrined 
with the scope they were understood to have when the people adopted them, whether or not future 
legislatures or (yes) even future judges think that scope too broad.”) (quoting Dist. of Colum. v. Heller, 
554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008)) . 
181 Id. at 533. 
182 Id. at 534 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–63 (1992)). 
183  Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 243, 259–60 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
184 Id. at 239–40. 
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actual pornographic depictions of children might be able to evade 
prosecution by claiming that the depictions are computer generated.185 At 
the time, there was no evidence that this had ever occurred and computer 
generated images of children were still readily distinguishable from the real 
thing.186 Thomas speculated, however, that if technology ever evolved to a 
point where it became impossible to distinguish virtual from actual child 
pornography, the government’s interests in ensuring successful prosecution 
of child pornographers might justify a future restriction on virtual child 
pornography.187 Thomas suggested the inverse of the typical changed 
circumstances case––that an unconstitutional government action could 
eventually cross the threshold into constitutionality. 
Another First Amendment doctrine susceptible to the effects of 
changed factual circumstances is the one governing the regulation of adult-
oriented businesses.188 Under City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, local 
governments may enact zoning ordinances that restrict the locations of adult 
businesses in order to protect the public against detrimental “secondary 
effects” (e.g., drug use, crime, and prostitution), but not as a way to 
suppress that form of expression.189 Thus, if these substantial interests are 
served, the ordinance will comport with the First Amendment as long as it 
“allows for reasonable alternative avenues of communication.”190 In adult-
oriented business cases, the reasonable alternative avenues inquiry typically 
entails an assessment of other locations in the town where an adult-oriented 
business could be located.191
In TJS of New York v. Smithtown, the government argued that an 
ordinance should be deemed constitutionally valid as long as it provided 
reasonable alternative avenues at the time of enactment, rather than at the 
time of the challenge.192 In 2002, TJS purchased an existing adult 
entertainment store on a location that was grandfathered under a 1994 
ordinance that would have otherwise prohibited it.193 TJS continued to 
operate an adult business at the location and the town sought an order of 
closure.194 The Second Circuit, led by Judge Calabresi, held that courts 
185 Id. at 259. 
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 See generally Peter T. Cavallaro, Beneath Oceans, Airstrips, and Sports Stadiums: Negative 
Solution to the “Alternative Avenues” Time Frame Debate, 23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 487 (2013). 
189  City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46–48 (1986). 
190 Id. at 50. 
191  TJS of New York, Inc. v. Smithtown, 598 F.3d 17, 21 (2d Cir. 2010). 
192 Id. at 22. 
193 Id. at 19. 
194 Id. at 20. There had been ongoing First Amendment litigation with the previous owners of the 
location. Id.
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must consider the adequacy of alternative avenues at the time the ordinance 
is challenged, not at the time the ordinance was enacted.195 Judge Calabresi 
warned what could result from a contrary interpretation: 
If the only relevant question were whether an ordinance provided 
adequate alternatives on the day of its passage, any law that did so 
would thereafter be immune from First Amendment challenge. And 
speech that the Supreme Court has held to be protected by that 
Amendment would be silenced.196
This case in particular illustrates how the changed circumstances doctrine 
enables the courts to preserve individual rights in perpetuity. Without it, 
constitutional rights could be essentially limited in time by factual 
conditions that no longer exist. 
The final case in this section, Shelby County v. Holder, is the Supreme 
Court’s most recent and clearest articulation of the changed circumstances 
doctrine.197 It does not fit neatly with any of the other changed 
circumstances cases discussed above––it is the only Fifteenth Amendment 
case and the standard of review the Court employed is debatable. But it 
makes it abundantly clear that the Court views constitutional analysis to 
require consideration of the contextual facts and circumstances that exist 
when the law is challenged, not those that existed when the law was 
enacted.
Justice Kennedy was perhaps stating the obvious when he said during 
the Shelby County oral arguments, “[T]imes change.”198 But that simple 
proposition became the Court’s primary justification for striking down the 
preclearance coverage requirement in the Voting Rights Act of 1965.199 The 
provision at issue was a formula used to determine which states and 
counties were “covered” jurisdictions required to obtain approval from the 
federal government before passing voting laws.200 The Court had upheld the 
provision shortly after enactment.201
195 Id. at 22–23; see also Cnty. of DuPage v. Lake St. Spa, Inc., 916 N.E.2d 1240 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2009). The court noted that its holding could be in conflict with two other cases, but maintained that it 
had reached the proper result. Id. at 25; see also Daytona Grand, Inc. v. Daytona Beach, 490 F.3d 860 
(11th Cir. 2007); Bigg Wolf Discount Video Movie Sales, Inc. v. Montgomery Cnty., 256 F. Supp. 2d 
385 (D. Md. 2003). 
196 TJS of New York, 598 F.3d at 26. 
197 See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
198 Oral Argument at 38:41, Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (No. 12-96), 
www.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-96. 
199 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2624–31. 
200 Id. at 2619–20. 
201  South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 330 (1966). 
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The “extraordinary”202 measures, drafted to expire after five years, 
were enacted to combat blatant and widespread minority voter 
disenfranchisement throughout the South.203 Over forty years later, they 
remained in place and had become even more stringent.204 But the objective 
facts demonstrated that the minority voting rates had significantly improved 
over time, minority representation in political offices increased, and that the 
states no longer engaged in the improper practices that the law was intended 
to prevent.205 Because it was based on “decades-old data” and “eradicated 
practices,” the Court found that the law simply no longer made sense in 
light of existing conditions.206 “Current burdens,” the Court declared, “must 
be justified by current needs.”207
The Court’s terminology suggests that it was applying rational basis 
review, which was the standard the Court used to uphold the law in 1966.208
But the opinion clearly did not exhibit the level of legislative deference that 
is characteristic of rational basis review.209 This could suggest that the 
Court is willing to scrutinize the rationality of a law a little more carefully 
when it is particularly old and outdated.
The Court’s holding, though deemed virtually catastrophic by the 
media,210 was in fact rather modest.211 By relying only on the changed 
202  Although the provision contravened fundamental principles of federalism, the measures were 
deemed necessary to address entrenched racial discrimination in voting. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2618.
203 Id. at 2620. 
204 Id.
205 Id. at 2628–29. 
206 Id. at 2630. 
207 Id. (quotations omitted). 
208 See id. at 2629 (“Viewing the preclearance requirements as targeting [second-generational 
barriers] simply highlights the irrationality of continued reliance on the § 4 coverage formula . . . .”); id.
at 2630–31 (“It would have been irrational for Congress to distinguish between States in such a 
fundamental way based on 40-year-old data, when today’s statistics tell an entirely different story. And 
it would have been irrational to base coverage on the use of voting tests 40 years ago, when such tests 
have been illegal since that time. But that is exactly what Congress has done.”); Id. at 2625 (“We 
therefore concluded that ‘the coverage formula [was] rational in both practice and theory.’”) (quoting 
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 330 (1966)). 
209 See Larsen, supra note 19, at 111 (“This isn’t your mother’s rationality review.”). 
210 See, e.g., Dana Liebelson, The Supreme Court Gutted the Voting Rights Act. What Happened 
Next in These 8 States Will Not Shock You, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 8, 2014, 6:00 AM), 
www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/04/republican-voting-rights-supreme-court-id; Adam Liptak, Supreme
Court Invalidates Key Part of Voting Rights Act, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2013), www.nytimes.com/
2013/06/26/us/supreme-court-ruling.html?_r=0.
211 NATHANIEL PERSILY & THOMAS MANN, BROOKINGS INST., SHELBY COUNTY V. HOLDER AND 
THE FUTURE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 5 (Aug. 2013), www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/
papers/2013/08/09-shelby-v-holder-policy-mann/persily_mann_shelby-county-v-holder-policy-brief_v9.pdf. 
The Court evaluated a similar case six years earlier. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 
557 U.S. 193 (2009). In Northwest Austin, the Court employed constitutional avoidance, resolving the 
issue on statutory grounds, but “expressed serious doubts about the Act’s continued constitutionality.” 
Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2621.
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factual circumstances to find that the preclearance requirement had crossed 
from constitutionality to unconstitutionality, the Court left for another day 
far more complex issues––namely the scope of Congress’s power under the 
Fifteenth Amendment.212 Congress is now limited by Shelby County only 
from utilizing the same outdated preclearance formula but not from 
enacting law under the Fifteenth Amendment.213 If Congress determines 
that some degree of federal oversight is still required for certain 
jurisdictions, it may attempt to reconfigure the Voting Rights Act 
accordingly.
In addition to clearly demonstrating that the Supreme Court endorses, 
at least in one context, a time-of-challenge rather than time-of-enactment 
approach in evaluating a law’s constitutionality, Shelby County provides
invaluable guidance from the Supreme Court as to how the changed 
circumstances doctrine operates in practice.  
PRESERVING THE CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES DOCTRINE
AND PROTECTING ECONOMIC LIBERTY
The Supreme Court’s command in Carolene makes clear that the 
constitutionality of a law must be evaluated with regard to the facts that 
exist at the time the law is challenged; not the facts that existed when the 
law was enacted. This makes sense. If an old law impedes a constitutional 
right today, the government should not be able to justify it with the reasons 
that only existed long ago. Although this fundamental principle courses 
through many areas of constitutional jurisprudence, a number of lower 
courts have failed to adhere to it when reviewing challenges within the most 
expansive category of constitutional cases––those that apply rational basis 
review. The changed circumstances doctrine is, and should remain, a core 
principle of rational basis review in all areas of constitutional law. It could 
prove particularly beneficial for economic liberty by creating a meaningful 
judicial limit on the government’s power to enforce economic regulations 
after their utility has passed.
In the seventy-eight years since Carolene, the Court never explicitly 
overruled its dictate about changed factual circumstances.214 The Court has 
decided a number of rational basis review cases but all have involved 
challenges to the constitutionality of recently enacted laws, giving no 
opportunity for the Court to rule on the specific question raised by changed 
212 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631; see generally Richard L. Hasen, Shelby County and the 
Illusion of Minimalism, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 713 (2014).
213  Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631.
214  Heffner v. Murphy Petition, supra note 17, at *14. 
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factual circumstances.215 As a result of a lack of guidance from the Supreme 
Court, there is conflict amongst the lower courts over whether the changed 
circumstances doctrine is a part of rational basis review.216 There is also 
inconsistency between how rational basis review and heightened scrutiny 
levels are applied.217 The Supreme Court should clearly reaffirm the 
changed circumstances doctrine for rational basis review in order to resolve 
these discrepancies. Until it does, the lower courts should employ the 
changed circumstances doctrine in rational basis review cases because it is 
the correct approach under prevailing Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
The primary justification that courts have cited for rejecting the 
changed circumstances doctrine is its perceived conflict with the Court’s 
other rational basis review cases, which counsel almost unwavering judicial 
deference to legislative choices.218 It is understandable, then, that lower 
courts would hesitate to step in and invalidate even the most antiquated and 
seemingly obsolete laws––especially economic regulations––given the 
Court’s strong emphasis on judicial deference and its apparent disinterest in 
meaningfully protecting economic liberties.219
Carolene’s principle is consistently reflected throughout the Court’s 
constitutional jurisprudence, including rational basis review cases.220 But, as 
noted above, all of the Supreme Court’s rational basis review cases since 
Carolene involved recent legislative enactments.221 Thus, the Court’s 
instructions regarding deference were delivered when there were at least 
relatively contemporaneous legislative decisions on the line and the 
judiciary risked infringing on the currently acting legislature. This concern 
declines significantly when the legislative decisions were made by a 
legislature long ago and based on the factual circumstances relevant to the 
legislative action at that time. Principles of judicial deference instruct courts 
215 Id. Shelby County could be viewed as an exception to this; however, it does not apply the 
standard two-part rational basis review analysis. See supra notes 208–09 and accompanying text. 
216 Compare Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56, 62 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 220 
(2014), Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Reg., 763 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1985), Murillo v. 
Bambrick, 681 F.2d 898 (3d Cir. 1982), and Jones v. Schneiderman, 888 F. Supp. 2d 421 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012), with Dias v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 567 F.3d 1169 (10th Cir. 2009), Santos v. City of Houston, 
80 F. Supp. 601 (S.D. Tex. 1994), and Milnot Co. v. Richardson, 350 F. Supp. 221 (S.D. Ill. 1972). See
also discussion supra pages 505–07. Scholars also disagree over whether the changed circumstances 
doctrine should apply, and in which types of cases. See Larsen, supra note 19 (arguing that changed 
circumstances should only be considered in heightened scrutiny); Ponomarenko, supra note 19 (arguing 
that changed circumstances should be considered for substance-based tests, but that they are largely 
irrelevant for motives-based tests); Williamson, supra note 19 (arguing that the changed circumstances 
doctrine should be extended to equal protection rational basis review cases).  
217  See discussion supra pages 518–23. 
218 See discussion supra pages 499–506.
219 Id.
220 See discussion supra pages 518–23. 
221 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
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to respect the role and judgment of the legislature, but not to turn a blind 
eye to an irrational law that no longer has factual grounding in the modern 
world. 
What this means is that reliance on some of the Court’s more recent 
rational basis review jurisprudence is misplaced. For example, the courts in 
Murillo, Burlington, and Schneiderman all relied on Clover Leaf Creamery
to support their rejections of the changed circumstances doctrine.222 In 
Clover Leaf Creamery, however, the Supreme Court’s primary concern was 
that the evidence and research underlying the legislation at issue was––
citing Carolene––“at least debatable.”223 Rational basis review 
jurisprudence has been clear that in such cases the courts must exercise 
restraint and defer to the legislature’s choices.224 But the changed 
circumstances doctrine may not apply when the rationality of a law is still 
genuinely debatable. A changed circumstances argument specifically asserts 
that, even though the law had a rational basis when first enacted, under 
current facts and circumstances, no rational basis remains––the law’s 
rationality is no longer debatable.
Constitutional laws do not necessarily remain constitutional forever. 
Those whose rights are impeded by outdated laws must be able to seek 
recourse from the judiciary when such laws become unconstitutional. 
Completely eliminating the changed circumstances doctrine could lead to 
absurd results: An outdated law that would be found unconstitutional if 
enacted today could nonetheless be lawfully enforced simply because it was 
constitutional at the time of its passage. This cannot be a reasonable 
interpretation of the Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence. 
Widespread application of the changed circumstances doctrine, on the other 
hand, would help to promote consistency and predictability because 
challenged regulations would be evaluated in every case with regard to the 
contemporaneous factual circumstances.  
Non-legal arguments against the changed circumstances doctrine are 
also unavailing. For example, the Murillo court’s concerns about imposing 
high institutional costs on the legislature are a straw man. The court 
assumes that, if the changed circumstances doctrine were commonplace, the 
legislature’s most likely response would be to undertake “painstaking 
effort[s]” to review and update old laws in order to avoid judicial 
intervention.225 But that is unlikely. Changed circumstances challenges can 
only be successfully waged against outdated laws that continue to be 
222  See discussion supra pages 513–15. 
223  United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938).
224  See discussion supra pages 499–506.
225  Murillo v. Bambrick, 681 F.2d 898, 911 (3d Cir. 1982).
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enforced after becoming irrational. Thus, the proportion of laws that would 
be invalidated in a given year would most likely be relatively small. 
Therefore, a legislature would have virtually no incentive to scour the 
books just so they can preemptively avoid the occasional judicial 
invalidation of a law.  
A legislature would certainly need to expend resources to review a law 
in light of the contemporaneous facts when a person files a claim alleging 
changed circumstances. But this is simply the consequence of judicial 
review and would not seem to increase the institutional costs beyond what 
the legislature should otherwise expect. In fact, the review process for 
everyone involved—challenger, government, and court—might be 
considerably less burdensome because everyone spared trying to ascertain 
elusive factual conditions from the past or arcane legislative histories. In 
any event, legislators might have little investment in these outdated laws, 
could be happy to see them go, and would be unlikely to waste the time or 
effort on amending them. Even if the changed circumstances doctrine could 
lead to some increased institutional costs for the legislature, this hardly 
seems a strong reason to contravene an established and valuable principle of 
constitutional analysis.
As a concluding observation, one positive effect of the changed 
circumstances doctrine is that it could enhance judicial protections of 
economic liberty. The current state of rational basis review and the Court’s 
disfavored treatment of economic liberty are not only contrary to the 
constitutional framers’ intent and purpose,226 they can also lead to extensive 
negative consequences.227 As lower courts and state courts of last resort 
demonstrate a greater willingness to subject economic regulations to 
genuine factual scrutiny under rational basis review,228 the changed 
circumstances doctrine could prove an important judicial tool to eliminate 
arcane regulations that no longer comport with the Constitution.  
226 See generally TIMOTHY SANDEFUR, THE CONSCIENCE OF THE CONSTITUTION: THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND THE RIGHT TO LIBERTY (2014); Barnett, supra note 1; Foley, 
supra note 1; James W. Ely, Jr., Economic Liberties and the Original Meaning of the Constitution, 45 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 673 (2008); Neily, supra note 1; Timothy Sandefur, The Right to Earn a Living,
supra note 1. 
227 See generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN AND ROBERT D. TOLLISON, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC
CHOICE (1972); Randy E. Barnett, Does the Constitution Protect Economic Liberty?, 35 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 5 (2012); Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM.
ECON. REV. 291, 291–303 (1974); Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Public Choice Theory and Occupational 
Licensing, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 209, 216–22 (2016); Raynor, supra note 1; Steven M. Simpson, 
Judicial Abdication and the Rise of Special Interests, 6 CHAP. L. REV. 173, 176–77 (2003); Brief for 
Todd J. Zywicki, as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellees, St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 
F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 2013) (No. 11-30756), 2011 WL 6779085.
228 See supra pages 505–06. 
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The issues that the changed circumstances doctrine addresses are 
particularly salient to economic regulation. Economic laws are present in 
virtually every facet of our lives––the vast majority of occupations, 
industries, products, and markets are subject to some degree of regulation 
from one or more levels of government.229 Given the remarkable rate of 
human innovation, social change, and the malleability of markets, economic 
regulations are uniquely susceptible to obsolescence.230 The consequences 
of an overabundance of arcane and cumbersome regulation can be highly 
detrimental––hindering economic growth, for example, or disparately 
limiting economic opportunities for poor and minority populations.231
Moreover, economic regulation is uniquely prone to abuses—embedded, 
politically-connected businesses encouraging government regulation as a 
shield against competition under a guise of protecting public health, safety, 
and welfare.232
229 See, e.g., Larkin, supra note 227; Simpson, supra note 227; DICK M. CARPENTER II ET AL.,
INST. FOR JUSTICE, LICENSE TO WORK: A NATIONAL STUDY OF BURDENS FROM OCCUPATIONAL
LICENSING 6–7 (2012), www.ij.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/licensetowork1.pdf; Michael D. 
Tanner, Too Many Laws, Too Much Regulation, NAT’L REV. (Mar. 2, 2016, 4:00 AM), www.national
review.com/article/432181/regulation-versus-freedom; Over-Regulated America, ECONOMIST (Feb. 18, 
2012), www.economist.com/node/21547789. 
230 See, e.g., Christopher Koopman & Patrick McLaughlin, When Technology Makes Regulations 
Obsolete, MERCATUS CTR. (May 11, 2016), www.mercatus.org/expert_commentary/when-technology-
makes-regulations-obsolete; Phillip K. Howard, How Stupid, Redundant, Obsolete Laws Are Paralyzing 
Us, FISCAL TIMES: REBOOT AMERICA (Feb. 24, 2015), http://rebootamerica.thefiscaltimes.com/index.
php/how-stupid-redundant-obsolete-laws-are-paralyzing-us.
231 See, e.g., John W. Dawson & John J. Seater, Federal Regulation and Aggregate Economic 
Growth, 18 J. ECON. GROWTH 137 (2013) (growth of federal regulation over the past sixty years 
decreased economic growth by an average two percent per year); Robert G. McCloskey, Economic Due 
Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 S. Ct. 34, 50 (1962); Raynor, supra
note 1, at 1094–95; Scott Beyer, How San Francisco’s Progressive Policies Are Hurting the Poor,
REASON (Nov. 9, 2014), www.reason.com/archives/2014/11/09/how-san-franciscos-progressive-pol
icies.
232 A circuit split has emerged over the last decade and a half regarding whether naked 
protectionism, with nothing more, qualifies as a legitimate government purpose for economic regulation. 
Compare Sensational Smiles, LLC v. Mullen, 793 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 2015), and Powers v. Harris, 379 
F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004), with St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 2013), and
Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002); see also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 
U.S. 456, 471 (1981) (under the Commerce Clause, “[i]f a state law purporting to promote 
environmental purposes is in reality ‘simple economic protectionism,’ [the Court has] applied a 
‘virtually per se rule of invalidity’”). In economic regulation cases, as noted above, the changed 
circumstances doctrine will typically focus on the objective facts and their bearing on the means-end 
relationship between a law and the government’s purpose. But if pure economic protectionism, without 
any associated public health, safety, or welfare benefits, is a legitimate government purpose, then it 
seems unlikely that economic regulation could ever be held unconstitutional. Almost all laws could be 
justified as means to further protectionist purposes. Under this scenario, the objective facts no longer 
matter, much less whether those facts have changed. For different perspectives on the circuit split, see 
generally Evan Bernick, Towards a Consistent Economic Liberty Jurisprudence, 23 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 479 (2016); Katherine M. Rudish, Unearthing the Public Interest: Recognizing Intrastate 
Economic Protectionism as a Legitimate Government Interest, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1485 (2012). 
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Broad grants of government power to regulate economic activities––
even those originally intended to serve the public health, safety, and 
welfare––can, over time, begin to serve primarily protectionist ends. Judge 
Brown of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
expressed great concern about this in her concurrence in Hettinga v. United 
States.233 The majority upheld certain provisions under the Milk Regulatory 
Equity Act (MREA), which imposed complex price controls upon milk 
producers and handlers and required both to pay into a redistributive 
fund.234 One enterprising dairyman found a way to sell gallons of milk for 
twenty cents less than his competitors by taking advantage of a producer-
handler exemption.235 Dairy lobbyists successfully petitioned to have the 
exemption eliminated.236 The court upheld the revised regulations under 
rational basis review.237
Judge Brown lamented that the court was bound to reach the 
conclusion that it did, explaining that the Supreme Court had “abdicated its 
constitutional duty to protect economic rights” in its development of 
rational basis review and relegation of economic liberty to a “lower echelon 
of constitutional protection.”238 Judge Brown suggested that once-legitimate 
interests underlying the enactment of the MREA—correcting “disorderly 
market conduct” after the Depression––no longer existed, and the only 
remaining purpose was to enrich the dairy industry at the expense of 
consumers.239 The exact situation in Hettinga would not have presented an 
ideal opportunity for challenge under the changed circumstances doctrine—
the challenged government action was a recent legislative enactment to 
close the producer-handler exemption. But there is certainly a changed 
circumstances argument to be made that the broader MREA regulatory 
scheme places “current burdens” on economic liberty that may very well 
not be “justified by current needs.”
233 See Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 480–83 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Brown, J., concurring). 




238 Id. at 482 (Brown, J., concurring) (“Rational basis review means property is at the mercy of 
the pillagers. The constitutional guarantee of liberty deserves more respect—a lot more.”). 
239 Id. (Brown, J., concurring) (“To be sure, the economic climate [during the Depression] was 
truly dire, but 78 years later, the same tired trope about ‘disorderly market conduct’ is still extant.”) 
(citing Alto Dairy v. Veneman, 336 F.3d 560, 562 (7th Cir. 2003)). Judge Brown also hinted at the role 
of changed circumstances in Edwards v. District of Columbia, a First Amendment challenge to the 
licensing requirements for tour guides in the District of Columbia. Stating that “reliance on decades-old 
evidence says nothing of the present state of affairs,” Judge Brown discussed modern circumstances, 
which include crowd-sourcing review operations such as Yelp and TripAdvisor, that undermined the 
District’s argument that licensing was necessary to protect the public from unscrupulous tour guides 
who fleece unsuspecting tourists. See Edwards v. District of Columbia, 755 F.3d 996 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
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The impact that the changed circumstances doctrine could have in 
terms of scaling back judicial deference or helping to restore economic 
liberty is modest––it is little more than rational basis review with nibble. As 
Shelby County illustrates, the changed circumstances doctrine is a 
minimalist approach. It does not require altering the rational basis standard 
or changing the constitutional status of economic liberties. And the class of 
claims to which the changed circumstances doctrine might apply is 
relatively narrow. But for those whose economic liberties are impeded by 
cumbersome and outdated economic regulations, the changed circumstances 
doctrine could provide a small, but meaningful opportunity to wage 
effective challenges in court to vindicate their constitutional rights.
